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Federalism, the Commerce Clause, and the
Constitutionality of the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act of 2004
RYAN R. WILMERrNG*
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed
INTRODUCTION
Over the last seventy years, the constitutional limits on the power of the federal
government have eroded. Through its complicity-and in some cases, its authorization
and encouragement-the Supreme Court has given Congress the power to expand its
regulatory reach to nearly every area of American life: personal and commercial, local
and national, civil and criminal. Initially, it appeared that the Court's most recent
proclamations regarding the commerce power may have the effect of reigning in the
reach of Congress, particularly in the area of federal criminal law. 2 Subsequent actions,
however, have proven otherwise. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004
("UVVA") is the latest example of a congressional act that violates the spirit, although
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2002,
Michigan State University. I would like to thank Professor Dan Conkle and Howard Anderson
for their comments regarding the direction of this Note. I would also like to thank Professor
Charles Geyh and Richard Wilmering, J.D. for their editorial comments on earlier drafts of this
Note.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.).
2. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
573, 573 (2004) (citing other commentators and noting that the initial reaction to the Supreme
Court's most recent Commerce Clause decisions was that "these decisions would likely have a
significant effect on the scope of federal criminal law"); see also John S. Baker, Jr., United
States v. Morrison and Other Arguments Against Federal "Hate Crimes " Legislation, 80 B.U.
L. REv. 1191, 1193 (2000) (recognizing "a more unified commitment within the Court to
enforce constitutional limits on Congress's legislative powers"); Erwin Chemerinsky, Shrinking
Federal Powers, TRAL, Jan. 2001, at 82, 83 (discussing recent cases indicating that at least
"five justices are committed to enforcing their vision of federalism and limiting the scope of
federal authority"); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The
Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REv. 605, 605
(2001) (discussing Court's recent efforts to strike "down legislation as being outside the limits
of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause"); Louis J. Virelli III & David S.
Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine
and the Future of Federal Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 926, 926 (2001) ("[T]he Court intends to reduce federal commerce power to a
fraction of what it had become in the previous sixty years.").
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not necessarily the letter, of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 3 As such, the
Court should go further to protect federalism against the growing federalization of
criminal law.
On April 1, 2004, President George W. Bush signed the UVVA into law.4 In
general, the UVVA, also known as Laci and Conner's Law,5 makes it a federal crime to
kill or harm an unborn fetus, without the consent of the woman pregnant with that
fetus, during the commission of another federal crime.
6
This Note will show that the UVVA, while technically within Congress's
jurisdictional control under current doctrine, should be unconstitutional. Part I will
briefly outline the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of congressional power,
focusing mainly on its most recent decisions. Part II will detail more closely the
specific structure and history of the UVVA, including its basis of federal jurisdiction.
Part III will apply the UVVA vis-A-vis the Court's modem Commerce Clause doctrine
to show that the substance of the UVVA violates the spirit of the Court's most recent
decisions. Finally, the Conclusion will briefly describe why a finding of
unconstitutionality through expansion of the current doctrine is correct and desirable,
both for this law specifically and other similar acts of Congress generally.
I. CONGRESSIONAL POWER
The limits on Congress's powers are as fundamental as the Constitution itself. This
Part will detail exactly what those limits are and how the courts, until very recently,
have fundamentally changed the checks and balances dynamic by giving little bite to
the intentionally exhaustive and specific list of enumerated powers.
A. Constitutional Limits on the Power of Congress to Regulate
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States provides an exhaustive
list of Congress's powers. They include powers that are almost indisputably necessary
for a central government to persevere, including powers over national defense and the
military7 and national currency.8 The more controversial powers are found in the
3. To be sure, this Note does not address other, more "mainstream" arguments against
the UVVA, including, most importantly, that the law infringes on a woman's right to privacy
(i.e., right to abortion). See, e.g., Judy Holland, Peterson Case Stirs Debate Over Abortion,
Unborn Victims, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30,2003, at 3B; Jessica Greenfield, Bush Signs Law Granting
Personhood to Fetuses, NAT'L NOW TIMES, Spring 2004, at 15, available at
http://www.now.org/nntispring-2004/personhood.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2004); see also Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating criminal abortion statute as unconstitutional).
4. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
5.Id. § 1.
6. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (2004).
7. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-12, 15 (granting Congress the power "[ft]o
declare War ... ; raise and support Armies... ; [and] provide for calling forth the Militia").
8. See, e.g., id. at cl. 5-6 (granting Congress the power "[t]o coin money, regulate the
Value thereof... ; [and] provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting").
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Commerce Clause9 and the Necessary and Proper Clause.'O These clauses will be the
focus of the remainder of this Part.
1. The Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court's first attempt at defining Congress's commerce power came in
1824,"' when the Court stated that commerce "describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations.' 12 Commerce Clause jurisprudence remained
relatively stable until 1937, during which time "[t]he blackletter rule was simple to
apply: If something moved across state borders, Congress was empowered to regulate
it.
,13
In 1937, however, the Court's Commerce Clause doctrine changed dramatically
with the landmark decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. ,' in which the Supreme Court noted that completely local activity may
affect interstate commerce to such a degree as to make it a matter of interstate
concern.15 Since this decision, "[flederal regulation under the Commerce Clause...
encountered little resistance by the Supreme Court,"' 6 essentially needing only to pass
a rational basis test of constitutionality.'
7
The Court in United States v. Lopez,' t however, reverted to earlier, more stringent
scrutiny of the commerce power. Lopez involved a challenge to the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm within five
9. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . i... Id  at cl. 3.
10. "The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof"
Id. at cl. 18.
11. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824); Michael Bono, Case Note: Judicial
Limitations on Congressional Power Under United States v. Morrison, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
229, 235 (2001).
12. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90. "The commerce power is a power to lay down the rule
by which commerce is to be govemed." Bono, supra note 11, at 235 n.40 (citing Gibbons, 22
U.S. at 189-90). See Jennifer L. Wethington, Constitutional Law--Commerce Clause-Violence
Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy Exceeds Congress's Powers to Regulate Interstate
Commerce, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 485, 491 (2001).
13. Wethington, supra note 12, at 492 (footnote omitted).
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
15. Id. at 37.
16. George P. Ferro, Note, Affecting Commerce: Post Lopez Review of the Hobbs Act,
66 ALA. L. REv. 1197, 1198 (2003) (footnote omitted).
17. "Rational basis" requires only that legislation bear a rational relationship to the
government's legitimate state interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973); United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569,
577 (3d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) ("[I]n the
years since Jones, Congress has had considerably greater latitude in regulating conduct and
transactions under the Commerce Clause than our previous case law permitted." (citation
omitted)).
18. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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hundred feet of a school. 19 The statute did not regulate, nor did possession have to be
involved in, interstate commerce.
20
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 2' held that any activity must
"substantially affect interstate commerce" before Congress may constitutionally
regulate it. 22 The majority identified three permissible categories of commerce power
regulation: 1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce;" 2) "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce;"
and 3) "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." 23 In
striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act under the third category, 4 the Court
noted that the regulated activity at issue was neither commercial nor required to be in
interstate commerce. 25 The Court also expressed its concern that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act infringed on the states' powers to regulate individuals' activities.
26
[U]nder the Government's "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of
individual citizens .... Under the theories that the Government presents .... it is
difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been
sovereign.
27
The Court thus struck down the law as an unconstitutional use of the commerce
power.28
The Supreme Court's curtailment of Congress's commerce power continued five
years later in United States v. Morrison,29 a case involving a challenge to the Violence
Against Women Act ("VAWA").30 That Act provided, inter alia, a federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence. 3' The gender-motivated violence that was to
19. 18 U.S.C. § 922(qc(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
922(q)(2)(A) (2005)).
20. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 559.
23. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 568.
25. Id. at 567.
26. Id. at 564.
27. Id. (emphasis added); see also RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST
CoNsrrToN 317 (2004) (noting that, prior to Lopez, "Congress ha[d] claimed, and the
Supreme Court ha[d] permitted, what amounts to a general plenary power to legislate in any
manner it wishe[d]").
28. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, 567-68. Congress reacted to Lopez by passing another
version of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, this time further requiring knowing possession of a
firearm that has moved in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). The amended
version has not been struck down.
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30. Id. at 604-05.
31.42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
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form the basis for the civil remedy was not required to have had any direct connection
to interstate commerce.
32
As was the case in Lopez, only the third category ofpermissible Commerce Clause
regulation (i.e., substantially affects interstate commerce) was seriously argued in
Morrison.3 3 The Court enumerated four "significant considerations" that shaped its
decision in Lopez:34 the economic nature of the regulated activity,35 an express
jurisdictional element that limits the reach of the regulation to activities affecting
interstate commerce," congressional findings regarding the regulated activity's
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce,37 and a direct link between the regulated
activity and the substantial effect on interstate commerce.
38
Analyzing these considerations, the majority ultimately struck down the federal civil
remedy provided for in the VAWA. First, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are
not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity."39 Second, the VAWA contained no
jurisdictional element.40 Third, while the regulation was supported by congressional
findings, those findings were "not sufficient, by [themselves], to sustain the
constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation." 4' Finally, any link between gender-
motivated violent crime and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was tenuous at
best.
42
Moreover, the Court noted that "[t]he Constitution requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local."'43 Violence not directed at interstate
commerce "has always been the province of the States."" Chief Justice Rehnquist
could "think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the
32. See id. Congress did, however, include a statement that the purpose of the VAWA
was "to promote ... activities affecting interstate commerce." §13981(a). However, the
Supreme Court requires more than Congress's statement that the activity being regulated affects
interstate commerce. Infra note 41 and accompanying text.
33. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 610.
36.Id. at 611-12.
37. Id. at 612.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 613. The Court feigns to appear to be following precedent, claiming that "thus
far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature." Id. (citation omitted). This statement is
odd in light of, inter alia, Wickard v. Filburn, in which the Court upheld regulation of a farmer's
wheat harvested for self-consumption. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
40. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
41. Id. at 614 ("'Simply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity
substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."' (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995))). The Court went on to say that the province of
Congress to regulate any activity is ultimately for the Supreme Court to decide. Id.
42.Id. at 615-17.
43. Id. at 617-18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568); cf Wethington, supra note 12, at 509
("After Morrison, Congress is powerless to set the national standard under the Commerce
Clause.").
44. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (citation omitted).
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National Government and reposed in the states, than the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims.
' A5
2. The Necessary and Proper Clause
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to pass laws that are
"necessary and proper" for carrying out its Article I, Section 8 powers. And "[i]t is
through this [means-to-an-end] reasoning that an intrastate activity 'affecting' interstate
commerce can be reached through the commerce power.' 4 6 For some, the Necessary
and Proper Clause is an issue separate and distinct from, say, the Commerce Clause.47
As it currently stands in the Supreme Court, however, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, for purposes of this Note, is essentially intertwined and almost
indistinguishable from the Commerce Clause,48 and thus requires no further treatment.
B. The Judiciary's Failure to Strictly Enforce the Constitutional Mandate of
Limited Congressional Power
Despite the Supreme Court's seemingly more exacting scrutiny in its enumerated
powers doctrine, the federal courts remain reticent to strike down congressional acts
for reasons other than infringement on constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.
Meanwhile, Congress has continued to legislate in areas even farther beyond its Article
I authority. As Professor Randy Barnett notes, this is hardly a recent development:
Since the adoption of the Constitution, courts have eliminated clause after clause
that interfered with the exercise of government power. This started early with the
Necessary and Proper Clause, continued through Reconstruction with the
destruction of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and culminated in the post-
New Deal Court that gutted the Commerce Clause .... As a result of judicial
decisions, these provisions of the Constitution are largely gone and, in their
absence, the enacted Constitution has been lost and even forgotten.
49
Nevertheless, the issue of congressional overreach remains salient today because of
the areas to which the federal government's presence now extends.
45. Id. (emphasis added). The majority cites Justice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez,
saying, "'We always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power."' Id. at 618-19 (quoting Lopez,
514 U.S. at 584-85 (Thomas, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).
46. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584-85 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also David E. Engdahl, The Necessary and Proper Clause as an
Intrinsic Restraint on Federal Lawmaking Power, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 107, 108 (1998).
47. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 46, at 114-22 (arguing that Necessary and Proper
doctrine, not Commerce Clause doctrine, is appropriate in the "instrumentalities" cases, some of
the "channel" cases, and all of the "affecting" cases).
48. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59; Engdahl, supra note 46, at 115.
49. BARNETr, supra note 27, at 1.
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1. The Federalization of Criminal Law
Perhaps most disturbing of all-and most important for purposes of this Note-is
what some call the "federalization of criminal law." 50 This "did not occur in isolation;
on the contrary, it coincided with a broad national trend towards federalization and
centralization which extended to virtually all sectors of the U.S. economy." 51 Of
course, this was not originally part of the constitutional framework. Alexander
Hamilton explained the Framers' support for exclusively state criminal law:
There is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State
governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory
light-I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all
others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source ofpopular
obedience and attachment.
52
Government attempts to deal with crime should hardly be discouraged. The
problem, however, is that the Constitution's carefully constructed governmental
framework 3 has taken a backseat to political expedience,54 while the branch entrusted
50. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997); Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARiz.
ST. L.J. 825 (2000); Russell L. Weaver, Lopez and the Federalization of Criminal Law, 98 W.
VA. L. REV. 815 (1996).
51. Weaver, supra note 50, at 817.
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
Lauryn P. Gouldin, Controlled Substance Law: Cannabis, Compassionate Use and the
Commerce Clause: Why Developments in California May Limit the ConstitutionalReach of the
Federal Drug Laws, 1999 ANN. SURv. Am. L. 471, 496-97.
53. See Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 827-28. Prof. Ehrlich notes that the Ratifiers had a
clear vision of the Constitution's governmental framework:
Whatsoever object of government is confined in its operation and effects
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging
to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends in
its operation and effects beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be
considered as belonging to the government of the United States.
Id. at 827 (citing Raoul Berger, A Lawyer Lectures a Judge, 18 HAv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 851,
858 n.54 (1995) (quoting 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 399 (2d ed. 1836))). Another, although often less-
publicized, problem with the federalization of criminal law is the lack of double jeopardy
protection when one is tried for the same crime based on the same acts under state and federal
law. See id. at 838; cf Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134-37 (1959).
54. See Ferro, supra note 16, at 1210 ("Oftentimes, federal crimes are created for
political reasons with no attention given to their consequences."); cf Ehrlich, supra note 50, at
826-27. But see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court: Congress as the Audience?, 574
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 145, 150 (2001) (arguing that the protection of states'
rights should be left to the political process).
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with the duty and responsibility of protecting our constitutional constructs55 has, for the
most part, idly watched it occur.
The increased scope of federal criminal law is vast. Activities previously under the
exclusive province of the states5 6 include malicious destruction of property,5 7 drive-by
shooting,58 and non-payment of child support.59 In all, there are approximately 3600
federal crimes, 60 with new ones being added every term.
More often than not, additions to Title 18 of the United States Code6 ' are
congressional reactions to crimes that grab national headlines. For example, Congress
passed a federal criminal carj acking law in 199262 after a Maryland woman was killed
in a carjacking incident.63 (The fact that the perpetrator was convicted under state
murder and robbery statutes was apparently immaterial as far as Congress was
concerned.) 64 "Similar action was taken in 1994 in response to other publicized crimes,
a drive-by shooting and a murder by an escaped prisoner.,
65
Congressional grandstanding is to be expected, Constitution or not. Few traits are
more popular with constituencies than platforms that include being "tough on crime."
Opposition to federal criminal legislation is made all the more difficult when often the
best argument against it is that the legislation is beyond the scope of Congress's Article
I enumerated powers. This is especially true in an era when voters look more and more
to their public servants to "fix" things.66 Congress, therefore, while technically the
55. See U.S. CONST. art. III; BARNETT, supra note 27, at 132-42 (discussing the
judiciary's power of nullification).
56. See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 50, at 816 (listing categories of federal crimes);
Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 825-27 (describing more recent trends in the federalization of
criminal law); id. at 837 (noting that it is the "deliberate design of federalism" that the states
possess the general police power).
57. Weaver, supra note 50, at 817 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
58. Id. at 816 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)).
59. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994)).
60. Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 826 (citing James A. Strezzella, The Federalization of
Criminal Law, TASKFORCE ON FED. OFCRIM. LAW REP. A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. at 7-10, app. c
(1998)).
61. "Crimes and Criminal Procedure."
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000). The courts of
appeals have upheld the statute because the car has, at some point, moved in interstate
commerce. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 607 (citing United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319,320-
21 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing cases from seven circuits)).
63. Ehrlich, supra note 50, at 825 (footnotes omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. (footnotes omitted).
66.
Of course, it is much easier to ride the current wave of federalizing every
human misdeed in the name of saving the world from some evil than to
uphold a constitutional oath which prescribes a procedural structure by
which the Nation is protected from what is perhaps the worst evil,
totalitarianism. Who, after all, wants to be amongst those Members of




culprit, should not be made to bear the entire blame for the federal government's over-
expansion into criminal law.67 The federal judiciary also has a duty to provide a check
on Congress's power-that is to say, to prevent Congress from creating a plenary
police power.
2. The Presumption of Constitutionality
As noted above, the judiciary's deferential approach to the commerce power began
nearly seventy years ago. To be fair, a presumption of constitutionality existed at
ratification.68 Even Justice Clarence Thomas, whom Professor Barnett describes as one
"willing to consider first principles" 69 and who voted with the majority in both Lopez7°
and Morrison,7' has noted that legislation "comes to us bearing a strong presumption of
validity." 72 Nevertheless, the federal courts have a constitutional duty to strike down
unconstitutional laws:
Th[e] Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government. If
the general legislature should at any time overleap their limits, the judicial
department is a constitutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers,
if they make a law which the Constitution does not authorize, it is void; and the
judicial power.., will declare it to be void.73
Thus, the judiciary's reluctance to invalidate congressional acts not authorized by
Article I amounts to constitutional abdication.
The issue remains, however, when the judiciary may properly substitute its own
judgment for that of Congress if the presumption of constitutional validity is to
maintain significance. Where Congress makes no attempt to prove that a regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, like in Lopez and the UVVA, the
150 CONG. REC. H657 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Paul). "[T]he
Supreme Court agrees with its fellow federal judges that Congress has a tendency to
claim to solve social problems by creating new crimes .... A majority of the Court no
doubt considered the Gun Free School Zones Act and the [VAWA] to be just such
unnecessary legislation .... Bradley, supra note 2, at 591.
67. For the alternative view that Congress has not gone far enough in creating federal
crimes, see generally, Troy A. Scotting, Comment: Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger
Federal Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REv. 853 (2001) (arguing that federal criminal law is being
underutilized in the area of hate crimes).
68. BARNETT, supra note 27, at 151-52 (quoting, inter alia, Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827)).
69. Id. at 151.
70. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 550 (1995).
71. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 600 (2000).
72. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
73. Speech of Oliver Elsworth to the Connecticut ratification convention (Jan. 7, 1788)
in 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 196 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836). But see Marci A. Hamilton, The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCIENCE 93, 94 (2001) (arguing that Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) provided a strong statement "that judicial review over federalism is
contrary to the constitutional design").
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presumption is easier to overcome.74 In that situation, Congress has failed to provide
the courts with a basis for its regulation. Absent proper findings from Congress, the
courts would seem to have little else to guide their decisions as to whether an activity
"affects" interstate commerce.
Where Congress has undertaken significant efforts to substantiate its claims that an
activity substantially affects interstate commerce, however, the presumption should be
harder to overcome. In fact, some have argued that the judiciary has no business
striking down an act for which Congress has produced voluminous findings and reports
regarding its effects on interstate commerce, 75 as was the case in Morrison.76 After all,
the courts are unable to conduct their own investigations and would thus be
invalidating laws based on their own conclusions and on their implicit distrust of
Congress's findings or motives.77
The argument that the presumption cannot be overcome in cases where an act is
complemented with congressional findings is misplaced. First, that argument
presupposes that the congressional findings actually support a conclusion that the
Supreme Court requires in order to pass constitutional muster. If the Court were to say,
as it has, that an activity must substantially affect interstate commerce, then the activity
must actually substantially affect interstate commerce; it would not be enough to
merely say as much in self-interested and self-prophesizing congressional findings. 78 If
it were otherwise, satisfying Article I would become a mere formality.
Second, the Court determines what in fact the test or standard is that Congress must
meet or pass in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the Court is the
final authority as to whether Congress has met or passed the applicable test or standard.
As such, the Court may still find unconstitutional an act accompanied by congressional
findings as to a regulated activity's effect on interstate commerce, for example. The
74. But see Weaver, supra note 50, at 822 (arguing that the Supreme Court may have
upheld the Gun-Free School Zones Act had Congress made explicit findings as to the economic
effects of gun possession in school zones).
75. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 2, at 611 (concluding that, where Congress has
produced findings of an activity's effect on interstate commerce and has a rational basis for
them, a court's subsequent invalidation of the law "is not merely holding Congress within its
constitutional authority but is substituting its own judgment for that of the legislative branch...
. [T]here is no limit to the Court's authority if it can strike down legislation for which Congress
had a rational basis for finding... a [meaningful] connection [to commerce]"); Jackson, supra
note 54, at 150-53.
76. The majority in Morrison made a point of mentioning that it had made its decision
"[w]ith this presumption of constitutionality in mind." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607; Cf Bono,
supra note 11, at 252 (concluding that "the Court's history of deferring to congressional
findings to show the connection between local and interstate activity is not likely to be
continued following the Morrison decision").
77. See Jackson, supra note 54, at 150 (arguing that the Supreme Court's recent
decisions "betray a genuine mistrust of Congress" and "the Court's apparent view of Congress
as a body that creates laws without real deliberation on the need for federal legislation and
without knowledge of or respect for the role of the states").
78. See Bradley, supra note 2, at 578 ("Lopez, and even more clearly Morrison, requires
not just lip service in the statute, but rather an independent finding by the courts that the activity
in question in fact substantially affects interstate commerce, regardless of the statutory language
or congressional findings.").
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Court could determine that the findings do not prove a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. It could also decide that the "new" standard is "directly and substantially
affecting interstate commerce," so that while the congressional findings show the
activity's substantial effect, they do not show any direct effect.
Concededly, some of these hypothesized results may be troubling in their own right,
but they nevertheless show that the presumption of constitutionality is rebuttable, even
where Congress has provided findings for its legislation. The presumption maintains its
relevance and importance today. It does not, however, displace the role of the judiciary
in protecting the constitutional framework.79
3. Developments Since Lopez
Shortly after Lopez, the Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to expand its
reasoning when it refused to grant certiorari in Cargill, Inc. v. United States.0 The
Army Corps of Engineers sought to apply the Clean Water Act to water pools where
migratory birds land. 8' Justice Thomas argued that the Corps' "assumption ... that the
self-propelled flight of birds across state lines creates a sufficient interstate nexus to
justify the Corps' assertion ofjurisdiction over any standing water that could serve as a
habitat for migratory birds ... test[s] the very 'bounds of reason." 8 2 Although the only
possible interstate and commercial activities involved were the avian migratory habits,
Justice Thomas was unable to convince enough of his brethren to have the case heard.
Five years later, the Court again refused an opportunity to further clarify and expand
its Commerce Clause doctrine.8 3 In Jones v. United States, 8 4 decided the same year as
Morrison, Jones argued that his federal arson conviction85 should be overturned
because Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the
federal arson statute.8 6 The Court did overturn the conviction, but did so on grounds of
statutory interpretation rather than constitutional interpretation. 87 In so doing, the Court
79. For an alternative view on the presumption of constitutionality, see Barnett, supra
note 27, at 151-52, 253-69 (arguing that "[t]he original meaning of [the Constitution] argues
strongly against a presumption of constitutionality and in favor of [a] contrary construction" that
Prof Barnett describes as "the Presumption of Liberty").
80. 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
81. Id. at 955-56.
82. Id. at 958 (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir.
1995)).
83. For an alternative view, see Bradley, supra note 2, at 583-87 (arguing that Jones is
highly informative as to the Court's direction in federalism cases). [
84. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
85. Defendant Jones threw a Molotov cocktail into the Fort Wayne, Indiana home of his
cousin, severely damaging the home. Id. at 851.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
87. Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-59. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, however,
concurred separately to note that he "express[ed] no view on the question whether the federal
arson statute . . . is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial
activities." Id. at 860 (Thomas, J., concurring). Presumably, he and Justice Scalia did not wish
their votes with the majority to imply their approval of the federal arson statute, even in the
commercial context.
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missed an opportunity to further expand its "new" enumerated powers doctrine.'8 This
outcome is quite troubling indeed, as the Court had before it the quintessential
federalized crime and not even in concurrence did it discuss a plenary police power.
89
Decisions of lower federal courts since Lopez have been even more deferential to
Congress. 9° The Eleventh Circuit, for example, rejected aLopez-type argument that the
government must prove under the Hobbs Act that the defendant's actions had a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.91 Even more troubling was the District of
Columbia Circuit's requiring a mere "'explicit' and 'concrete' effect" on interstate
commerce, 92 as an effect may be "explicit" and "concrete" without being substantial or
even slight. The problem with such formulations is that they not only violate the spirit
of Lopez,93 they also violate the express language of Lopez, which requires a
substantial effect.
Shortly after Lopez was decided, the Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the
federal car acking statute, finding that "Congress had a rational basis for believing that
carjacking substantially affects interstate commerce."94 In United States v. Bolton,95 the
Tenth Circuit upheld a constitutional challenge to the Hobbs Act, holding "that the
Hobbs Act regulates activities which in aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. In enacting the Hobbs Act, Congress determined that robbery and extortion
are activities which through repetition may have substantial detrimental effects on
interstate commerce.,
96
As Professor Russell Weaver suggests, perhaps the reaction of the lower courts is
predictable. "[T]he 'modem view' of the Commerce Clause... has been taught in law
schools for decades,. . . [and t]he Lopez decision, surprising as it was, did not break
lower-court judges out of this mindset., 97
88. Perhaps this decision can best be explained as adherence to precedent, for fifteen
years earlier, the Supreme Court upheld the federal arson statute in the commercial building
context. See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985).
89. While it is true that, as a general rule, the Supreme Court will not address
constitutional arguments if it can resolve a controversy on other grounds, it is nonetheless
disappointing that it failed to capitalize on an opportunity to further define the commerce power.
For an alternative view, see Bradley, supra note 2, at 583-86 (arguing that Jones represents an
application of Lopez, albeit under the guise of statutory interpretation).
90. Cf Bradley, supra note 2, at 575 (noting that Lopez and Morrison have had little
effect on the decisions of lower courts); Ferro, supra note 16, at 1205-09 (arguing that the
approach of lower federal courts has been to construe Lopez so narrowly that it is applicable
only in cases identical to Lopez).
91. See United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11 th Cir. 1997) (stating that
"[blecause the Hobbs Act contains [a] jurisdictional element,.., the Government only needs to
establish a minimal effect on interstate commerce to support a violation of the Hobbs Act").
92. United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
93. See infra Parts III.A, C.
94. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 576 (3d Cir. 1995).
95 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
96. Id. at 399.
97. Weaver, supra note 50, at 840.
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II. THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT OF 2004
A. Background
The UVVA makes it a federal crime to "cause[] the death of, or bodily injury... to,
a child, who is in utero at the time 9 8 during the commission of another enumerated
federal crime." It represents the latest example of political grandstanding that has
become commonplace in Washington.
The UVVA, like many other federalized laws before it, was promulgated in
response to a nationally publicized news story. 00 The alternative name for the UVVA,
Laci and Conner's Law, 1 ' is derived from the first names of a twenty-seven year-old
mother and her unborn son, who were murdered on Christmas Eve of 2002. Scott
Peterson, Laci's widower, was charged with the murder of both, 0 2 and the Stanislaus
County District Attorney sought the death penalty for the murders of both Laci and
Conner.
10 3
Despite the fact that the state of California not only has a law making feticide a
felony punishable by death, 1"4 and despite the fact that Scott Peterson was charged with
the capital murder of his unborn son, Congress nonetheless again acted (or reacted)
reflexively. The reason for acting is obvious: passing a law to make the killing of an
unborn fetus a felony is politically popular,10 5 especially when the circumstance is
brought to the public's attention in the daily news. But not only was there no need for
the law in the specific circumstances of Conner Peterson, there is little reason for the
98. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(1) (West 2004).
99. See id. at § 1841(a)(1), (b) (listing, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2004) (drive-by
shooting); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (2000) (congressional, cabinet, and Supreme Court assassination,
kidnapping, and assault); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000) (consumer product tampering); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2231 (2000) (assault or resistance)).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65; 150 CONG. REC. H642 (daily ed. Feb.
26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hart); Susan Estrich, Laci Peterson's Unborn Child Becomes
Pawn in Abortion Debate, USA TODAY, Apr. 30, 2003, at 13A; Holland, supra note 3, at 3B.
101. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, § 1, 118 Stat. 568
(2004).
102. Christine Hanley & Dan Morain, The Nation; Scott Peterson Killed Wife in Their
Home, Police Say, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at 1.
103. See Nation in Brief, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2003, at A06; State Seeks Death for
Peterson, CHICAGO TRIBUNE REDEYE ED., Apr. 28,2003, at 8; see generally, What's Happening,
The Laci Peterson Web Site, at http://www.lacipeterson.com/whatshappening/index.html (last
updated June 8, 2003).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 190 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
105. Representative Sensenbrenner, during the UVVA debates in the House of
Representatives, for example, cited a Fox News poll showing that 84% of those polled favor a
separate criminal charge against Scott Peterson for the murder of Conner, a Newsweek poll
showing that 79% support a separate charge for an unborn victim, and another Fox News poll
showing 79% favor a separate charge for an unborn victim (including 69% support among self-
identified pro-choice respondents). Each of those polls found that less than 10% do not support




law outside of that context. Even if there were a pressing need for such a law, however,
Congress may not pass it without a basis in the Constitution.
Scott Peterson was charged with the murder of Conner Peterson under the
California state murder statute.1 6 The District Attorney charged that murder as a
capital offense. Thus, there is no more serious crime or punishment with which Scott
could be tried or for which he could be punished. Section 1841, then, would work
nothing more than a legal tautology in this case. In fact, while the killing of Conner
Peterson is being tried as a capital offense, the death penalty is unavailable under
§ 1841.1°7 Thus, the federal statute fails to fill any legal holes in the specific context of
Conner Peterson (not to mention the fact that, since Scott Peterson did not kill Conner
during the commission of a federal crime, Scott could not have been charged under
§ 1841 anyway).
Section 1841 would, however, add a separate and distinct offense vis-A-vis a
defendant's state law charges in some contexts. Feticide is written into the criminal
code of only twenty-nine states. 0 8 In the other twenty-one states, it is uncertain at best
whether a person who kills an unborn fetus without the pregnant mother's consent may
be charged with any degree of criminal homicide.'0 9 Congress, then, at least has some
justification for passing the UVVA, albeit a veiled one.
B. Legislative History
The UVVA was first considered in 1999, when it passed the House of
Representatives" 10 but failed to make it to the Senate floor for a vote. The House again
passed the bill in 2001,"' but the Senate again refused to consider it. The third time
proved the charm, as the bill passed the House in February 2004 by a vote of 254 to
163112 and passed the Senate one month later by a vote of 61 to 38.113 President George
W. Bush signed the UVVA into law on April 1, 2004.114
106. A California jury found Scott Peterson guilty of first-degree murder of Laci and
guilty of second-degree murder of Conner. Louis Sahagun & Mark Arax, Peterson Found Guilty
of Killing Pregnant Wife, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2004, at 1. The logical pitfalls of the verdict
notwithstanding, Peterson potentially faces a sentence of death, although not for the murder of
Conner, since his was in the second degree. See id.
107. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)(D) (West 2004).
108. 150 CONG. REC. H644 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Steams); 150
CONG. REC. S3165 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004) (statement of Sen. Voinovich). For examples of
state statutes expressly making feticide a crime, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(a)(5)
(2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.071 (West
2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.322-323 (2004); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205 (2000),
§188.035(1) (2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2901.0l1(B)(1)(a)(ii), (B)(1)(c) (West 2003); WIS. STAT. § 940.04 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
109. See generally, Alan S. Wasserstrom, Annotation, Homicide Based on
Killing of Unborn Child, 64 A.L.R. 5th 671 (2004).
110. See 145 CONG. REC. H9040 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1999).
111. See 147 CONG. REc. H1610, H1612, H1650 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2001).
112. 150 CONG. REC. H667 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004).
113. 150 CONG. REc. H3167 (2004).
114. H.R. 1997, 108th Cong. (2004).
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The congressional hearings and debates provide useful insight into what Congress
considered and, perhaps more importantly, what Congress did not consider, in enacting
the UVVA. During the House debate, the words "interstate," "commerce," and
"enumerated" were never uttered." 5 Nearly the entire debate focused on the
implications of the legislation on fetal rights, the definition of when life begins, and the
effect on Roe v. Wade and abortion rights. "
6
Texas Representative Ron Paul was the only member of the House to raise the
federalism issue." 7 As stated on his website, Representative Paul "never votes for
legislation unless the proposed measure is expressly authorized by the Constitution."
' 8
In the House debate, he described the UVVA as "yet another step closer to a national
police state," and noted that "a legal, constitutional, and philosophical mess [will]
result from attempts to federalize such... issue[s].""19 He summarized his opposition
to the bill as follows: "[The UVVA] ignores the danger of further federalizing that
which is properly reserved to State governments and, in so doing, throws legal
philosophy, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the insights of Chief Justice
Rehnquist out with the baby and the bathwater.' 20 Unfortunately, no other opponent of
the bill echoed Representative Paul's concerns, and no advocate attempted a
response. 121
The Senate debate afforded similarly scant coverage to the issues of federalism and
enumerated powers.12 Here, the words "Article I," "federalism," "substantial effect,"
and "states' rights" were never uttered. 123 "Interstate commerce" was mentioned once,
but in the context of being for states' rights so long as it does not interfere with
interstate commerce.' 24 Most of the debate centered on the various proposed
amendments. 125 The only comments offered regarding economic effects of regulated
activity were in the context of the Murray Amendment, 26 which was quickly
rejected. 27 Moreover, those comments were not related to the economic effects of
violence toward unborn victims but rather to victims of domestic abuse, the same kinds
of economic effects rejected in Morrison.
115. See 150 CONG. REC. H637-68 (2004).
116. See generally, id.
117. Id. at 657-58 (statement of Rep. Paul). Representative Paul's courage in
opposition to the measure should be duly noted, as his Republican Party overwhelmingly
supported the measure.
118. Web site of Congressman Ron Paul, Who is Ron Paul?, at
http://www.house.gov/paullbio.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
119. 150 CONG. REc. H657, H658 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep. Paul).
120. Id. at H658.
121. For a possible explanation for the conspicuous silence regarding
Representative Paul's concerns, see supra text accompanying note 173.
122. See 150 CONG. REC. S3124-67 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2004).
123. Id.
124. Id. at S3166 (statement of Sen. Allen).
125. See, e.g., id. at S3125 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (discussing the Feinstein
Amendment); id. at S3129-30 (statement of Sen. DeWine) (discussing same); id at S3151-54
(statement of Sen. Murray) (discussing the Murray Amendment).
126. Id. at S3152-64.
127. Id. at S3164.
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One interesting absence from the Senate debate was that of Delaware Senator
Joseph Biden, who was attending the funeral of his wife's grandmother.'2 Shortly
before the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison, Senator Biden wrote an article
sharply criticizing what he called a "bright line" between commercial and
noncommercial activity. 12 9 Senator Biden argued that "Congress may regulate
individual acts of sexual violence or domestic abuse, not all of which affect interstate
commerce, if such acts of gender-based violence, when considered cumulatively, exert
a substantial effect on interstate commerce."' 3 ° Senator Biden's article makes clear that
the Constitution will not be a barrier to the federal government's power grab. Alas,
while Senator Biden's interpretation of the constitutional propriety of the UVVA
during the debate may have proved insightful, it was not to be (although he did manage
to ultimately vote against the measure).'
3
'
Il. THE EFFECT OF LOPEZ AND MORRISON ON THE UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE
ACT
The UVVA, by making murder of an unborn fetus a federal crime, has federalized a
quintessential state-law crime. Such action violates the spirit of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Lopez and Morrison. It might seem, then, that the UVVA is
unconstitutional as written. Because the UVVA criminalizes only killings in connection
with another federal crime, however, Congress is (likely) technically acting within the
parameters of the Court's federalism doctrine.
Subpart A will analyze the UVVA in light of Lopez and Morrison, while leaving
aside for the moment the requirement that a charged killing occur in connection with
another federal crime. Subpart B will briefly explain why the law is nevertheless
constitutional. Finally, Subpart C will argue for an extension of current federalism
doctrine to include laws like the UVVA that violate the spirit, if not the letter, of Lopez
and Morrison.
A. The Unborn Victims of Violence Act and the "Spirit" of Lopez and Morrison
To determine whether an act of Congress is constitutional, one must first determine
whether Congress was acting pursuant to one of its enumerated powers.'32 This
128. Id. at S3151 (statement of Sen. Reid).
129. Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act: A Defense, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17 (2000); see also Wethington, supra note 12, at 298
(arguing that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate activities
that obstruct commerce, even if they are not themselves "economic in nature"); Jackson, supra
note 54, at 154 (concluding that Morrison created a "categorical line limiting the reach of
national power").
130. Biden, supra note 128, at 12.
131. See 150 CONG. REC. S3167 (daily ed. Mar. 25,2004) (statement of Sen. Coleman).
132. "Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers
enumerated in the Constitution." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,607 (2000). Because
the first sentence of the Constitution (other than the Preamble) is "[a]ll legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1,
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determination is guided, of course, by the text of the Constitution itself and the case
law interpreting the text.
Much like the possession of firearms in a school zone and gender-motivated
violence, violence against the unborn has no obvious relation to any of the Article I,
Section 8 enumerated power.' 33 And much like the aforementioned activities, the
government's best chance for success is found in the Commerce Clause,' 34 whose
analysis will shape the remainder of this Part.
In light of Morrison and especially Lopez, supporters of the UVVA may have
reason for concern. Under Lopez-Morrison doctrine, there are three permissible
categories of commerce power regulation. 135 Of those, like Lopez and Morrison
themselves, only the third category-that the regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce-is relevant to the UVVA, since the regulation contains no
jurisdictional requirement that the unborn victims be involved in interstate
commerce.'36 Thus, under the Supreme Court's modern Commerce Clause doctrine,
the government must be able to prove that violence against unborn fetuses substantially
affects interstate commerce.
The Court has developed four "significant considerations" to help determine
whether a regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce. 3 7 Each will be
handled in turn.
The first is the economic nature of the regulated activity. On the face of it, the
UVVA in no way regulates an economic activity. Violence against unborn fetuses is
neither a commercial activity nor rationally related to commerce generally. As the
majority stated in Morrison, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any
sense of the phrase, economic activity."'138 It is difficult to see how the analysis would
change in the context of violence against unborn fetuses. This consideration, then,
clearly cuts against the constitutionality of the UVVA.
The second consideration is an express jurisdictional element that limits the reach of
the regulation to activities affecting interstate commerce. One example of this is the
language that confines a violation of the federal arson statute to intentionally setting
ablaze "real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
"evaluating whether a federal law is constitutional must begin with whether Congress has acted
within the powers it is granted in the Constitution." BARNETIT, supra note 27, at 153.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
134. This Part presupposes (naively, perhaps) that the Commerce Clause is the only
constitutional basis for this federal legislation. Another possible argument, found most notably
in support of the Violence Against Women Act, is Congress's Enforcement Power under § 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607; see,
e.g., Biden supra note 128, at 7, 28-42. Of course, a § 5 rationale is unlikely to pass
constitutional scrutiny. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Morrison, Congress's enforcement
power was designed to ensure that the liberties guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment
were protected by the states but that Congress was powerless under this section to enforce those
liberties against private individuals. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619-27; the Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1883). Similarly, the
UVVA could hardly be said to be a congressional regulation designed to protect the civil rights
of private individuals as against the several states.
135. See supra text accompanying note 23.
136. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 2004).
137. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
138. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
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activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce .... ,,139 The benefits of an express
jurisdictional element are twofold. First, the reach of the federal regulation cannot
extend beyond that which is constitutionally permissible. If a person may be charged
with a federal crime only if his actions were involved in or affected interstate
commerce, the risk of federal overreaching is reduced because Congress may
constitutionally regulate interstate commerce. Conversely, the absence of limiting
language subjects individual citizens to a plenary police power, as the federal
government need not prove a connection to interstate commerce to procure a
conviction. Second, a federal regulation that contains nojurisdictional element makes
the job of the federal courts that must hear potential constitutional challenges to the
same much more difficult. That is to say, a jurisdictional element provides courts with
guidance as to the purpose and coverage of, and rationale for, the regulation. Without
it, courts are often left with little more than speculation and conjecture. Then, because
of the presumption of constitutionality,' 4 these courts are forced to engage in the
difficult task of analyzing every possible constitutional basis for the regulation.
Certainly, then, it is not particularly unreasonable for the Court to request that
Congress include a jurisdictional element when it passes federal regulations.
Here, a jurisdictional element arguably exists,14 albeit indirectly so. To be
convicted under § 1841, the death or serious bodily injury against the unborn fetus
must have occurred during the course, or in furtherance, of one of the listed federally
regulated activities. 14 This attempt to limit jurisdiction, however, represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the reasoning in Morrison.
First, the UVVA's jurisdictional element is indirect as far as it relies on the federal
jurisdiction of the other federally regulated activities. The UVVA fails to require that
the violence against an unborn fetus occur in interstate commerce or have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. In so doing, Congress cast the UVVA's penalties "over
a wider, and more purely intrastate, body of violent crime."'1
43
Second, the indirect jurisdictional element in the UVVA amounts to constitutional
piggybacking144 and an end-around the enumerated powers that, if upheld, would
relegate Lopez to a case of form over substance. Congress is apparently of the belief
that, if an activity may properly be regulated pursuant to its commerce power, every
potential offspring of that activity may also be properly regulated. Such a theory could
lead to federalism absurdities. For example (and hopefully without giving Congress
any ideas), Congress could enact federal conversion legislation for property stolen to
139. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2000) (interstate
domestic violence) ("A person who travels in interstate commerce ... with the intent to kill,
injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result
of such travel, commits or attempts to commit a crime of violence against that spouse or intimate
partner, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).").
140. See supra Part I.B.2.
141. See infra Part III.B.
142. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2), (b) (West Supp. 2004).
143. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (footnote omitted).
144. I use the term "constitutional piggybacking" to describe Congress's attempt to
regulate and criminalize every potential activity or consequence of activity that may properly be
described as "commercial" or "substantially affecting interstate commerce."
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purchase or acquire illicit drugs, as the sale1 5 and possession of drugs 146 are proper
objects of federal regulation. 47 This example's relation to interstate commerce is no
less tenuous than a situation in which an individual is charged under § 1841 for the
death of an unborn fetus that occurred in connection with the sale of narcotics. Nor is it
any less tenuous than a conviction under a hypothetical federal child neglect statute for
housing a child in a known drug den or crack house (that is, a place where narcotics are
regularly bought and sold).
Lopez makes clear, and later Morrison reiterates, that the purpose for the
jurisdictional element consideration is to limit the scope of the regulation to
commercial activities or to activities that substantially affect the interstate commerce.
What Congress has attempted here, though, is to limit the scope of the UVVA to
violence against unborn fetuses that occurs in conjunction with other federally
regulated activities. This obviously does not limit the scope of the UVVA to situations
in which the violence occurs in interstate commerce or substantially affects interstate
commerce, which is precisely what the Court found lacking in both Lopez and
Morrison. By failing to provide a tenable jurisdictional element, Congress has either
misunderstood or, worse, ignored the true import of those cases. Either way, the
government cannot credibly rely on subsection b as an express jurisdictional element.
This consideration, therefore, also cuts against the constitutionality of the UVVA.
Congressional findings regarding the regulated activity's substantial effect on
interstate commerce represent the third consideration. While Morrison has made clear
that even the existence of extensive congressional findings will not immunize the
regulation from unconstitutionality,1 48 Congress adopted no congressional findings
pursuant to its passage of the UVVA. Thus, this consideration requires no further
analysis, and it too cuts against the constitutionality of the UVVA.
The final consideration is the existence of a direct link between the regulated
activity and the substantial effect on interstate commerce. This link is easily established
in many federal criminal statutes. For example, the hijacking of truckload carriers
crossing state lines would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, as those
vehicles exist commercially to facilitate trade among the states. In the context of
violence against unborn fetuses, however, such a direct link does not exist. Moreover,
as the Morrison court notes, Lopez rejected the government's "costs of crime" and
"national productivity" arguments, arguing that such a scheme "would permit Congress
to 'regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent crime,
145. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
146. 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).
147. See United States v. Davis, 288 F.3d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Brown, 276 F.3d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing other cases upholding the constitutionality
of the Controlled Substances Act); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996)
(convicting defendant under 21 U.S.C. § § 841 and § 844, among other crimes). Butsee Raich v.
Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding the grant of a preliminary
injunction against the federal government, because the Controlled Substances Act was likely
unconstitutional as applied to intrastate harvesting and consumption of marijuana), cert. granted
124 S. Ct. 2909 (June 28, 2004) (No. 03-1454).
148. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; Ambre Howard, United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 461, 468 (2001).
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regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce.'"149 Indeed, Morrison's
warning of Congress's overreach vis-A-vis its commerce power is particularly
prescient:
If accepted, [the government's] reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress
may regulate gender-motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or
any other type of violence since gender-motivated violence, as a subset of all
violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of
which it is a part. 50
As were the cases with the VAWA and with the Gun-Free School Zone Act, the
UVVA attempts to regulate activity that is in no way directly linked to interstate
commerce. As much as the Court failed to find any such link in Morrison, it would
unlikely find one in the UVVA. This is the fourth of four considerations, therefore, that
cuts against the constitutionality of the UVVA.
While the Court has not given further guidance as to how these considerations
should be weighed and balanced, it is clear that where all four considerations favor the
same finding, the law will be found the same. Here, all four considerations favor a
finding of unconstitutionality. The UVVA itself, then, is unconstitutional under the
Lopez-Morrison considerations.
B. The Constitutionality of the UVVA
Despite the fact that the UVVA appears to fail each of the four Lopez-Morrison
considerations, the law is (likely) nevertheless constitutional under current federalism
doctrine. The reason is that the law does make every killing of an unborn fetus a
federal crime, only those that are in connection with another federal activity that
Congress presumably has jurisdiction to criminalize.
In this respect, the law can be analogized to the federal sentencing enhancements.' 5
For example, a federal criminal drug-trafficking defendant may receive an enhanced
sentence for having committed a crime while carrying a firearm. 15 2 These
enhancements have consistently been upheld as constitutional. 153 In fact, in 1998 the
149. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,564
(1995)).
150. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
151. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(d), (e) (2000). For discussions of the federal sentencing
enhancements, see, for example, Chereen J. Charlick & Steven F. Hubachek, Categorically
Confusing? Analyzing State Convictions Under Federal Enhancement Statutes, 14 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 289 (2002); Vivian Alberts, Comment, Federal Sentencing Enhancement:
Mandatory Penalties for Firearms Use Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
19 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 823 (1986); Rebecca L. Spiro, Note, Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
the Rehnquist Court: Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 103 (2000).
152. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 390 F.3d 145, 157 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Supreme Court interpreted the firearm-carry enhancement without any mention of its
constitutionality.
1 54
The analogy to the federal sentencing enhancements is obvious. If the government
may enhance a sentence by proving an aggravating factor, it should be able to
criminalize the aggravating conduct as well, because the effect on both parties will be
the same. The government must still prove the conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, 55
and the defendant's sentence will be the same under either system, assuming analogous
jury findings (that is, "aggravating conduct present" is the analog of "guilty," and
"aggravating conduct not present" is the analog of "not guilty").
Moreover, the issue of federalism is less pronounced where, as here, Congress
already has jurisdiction to regulate the conduct that forms the basis of the additional
regulation (assuming arguendo that Congress may constitutionally regulate the crimes
enumerated in § 1841 (b)). Put another way, Congress is already properly regulating the
conduct at issue; it is now merely creating another crime where certain consequences
result from the very same conduct (that is, the death of an unborn fetus). The UVVA,
then, does not attempt to regulate anything new and, therefore, should be constitutional
to the extent the crimes enumerated in § 1841 (b) are also constitutional.
C. The Current Federalism Doctrine Should Be Extended to Make Unconstitutional
the UVVA
The "spirit" of Lopez and Morrison was that congressional regulation of areas of
traditional state-concern is proper only where it is directed at activities that are
inherently commercial or that have a direct and significant effect on interstate
commerce. 156 Violent crime is the quintessential local concern that has traditionally
been left to the states to regulate.157 The UVVA, however, ignores the clear import of
these decisions by making the killing of an unborn fetus a federal crime. Extending
current federalism doctrine to make the UVVA unconstitutional would serve the
purpose of comporting with the true spirit of Lopez and Morrison.
The federal criminalization of violence against the unborn represents precisely the
infringement of rights traditionally left to the states that concerned Chief Justice
Rehnquist with the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the VAWA. ' Granting Congress
the authority to penalize violent crime may also allow Congress to regulate other areas
traditionally left to state regulation, a prospect that has disturbed some members of the
154. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
155. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that any factor
that increases a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
156. See generally supra notes 18-45 and accompanying text.
157. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (noting that there is "no better example of the
police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the states,
than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims").
158. "Given [Congress's] findings and [the government's] arguments, the concern that
we expressed in Lopez that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate
the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority seems well founded." Id. at
615 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
20051 FEDERALISM 1209
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Court.' 59 Justice Thomas has provided the most pointed criticism of the federalization
of criminal law,' 60 arguing that the Supreme Court has "always ... rejected readings of
the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to
exercise a police power" and that the case law makes "clear that there are real limits to
federal power."'' While Justice Thomas may have overstated his case, especially in
light of the sixty years of commerce power jurisprudence prior to Lopez, the crux of his
argument is well-received: the Constitution does not empower Congress to criminalize
activities as a general matter.
The UVVA represents Congress's latest attempt to create a plenary police power.
By comporting with only the holdings in Lopez and Morrison, Congress, like the lower
courts,162 has read the Court's recent federalism decisions too narrowly. Considering
the number of current members of the Court who are obviously troubled by this, the
UVVA's constitutionality may yet be in doubt. Fewer activities have stronger traditions
in purely state regulation than violent crimes. 63 As such, the states' rights advocates
who currently sit on the Supreme Court are unlikely to look favorably on federal
legislation that criminalizes violence against unborn fetuses, regardless of whether it is
"in or affecting interstate commerce" (which, in the case of the UVVA, it need not be).
The UVVA makes a traditionally local concern a national concern, and thus, flies in
the face of the Supreme Court's expressions that Congress ply more care when
exercising its commerce power.
While it is true that the UVVA does not regulate any additional conduct that
Congress is not already regulating, it is also true that it creates a separate and distinct
offense. This may properly be analogized to the federal sentencing enhancements,' 64
but the analogy is not perfectly congruent. It seems patently obvious that, if presented
with a choice between (1) a longer sentence because of a sentencing enhancement for
having caused the death of an unborn fetus, and (2) a longer sentence because of a
conviction under the UVVA, most would choose the former to avoid the additional
stigma of a murder conviction. In addition, by piggybacking to create a separate and
distinct offense, Congress has gone beyond the regulation of economic activity to
159. See, e.g., id. at 615-16 (arguing that if the Violence Against Women Act were
upheld, Congress would be able to regulate family law "and other areas of traditional state
regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage, divorce, and childrearing on the national
economy is undoubtedly significant"); id. at 618 n.8 ("With its careful enumeration of federal
powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal Government are
reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government
an unlimited license to regulate."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 ("The Constitution. . .withhold[s]
from Congress a plenary police power.").
160. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("By continuing to
apply th[e] rootless and malleable ['substantial effects'] standard, however circumscribed, the
Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause
has virtually no limits. Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see
Congress appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating commerce.").
161. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 90-95.
163. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
164. See supra Part III.B.
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include the regulation of non-economic activity that flows from conduct whose other
object or consequence has an effect on interstate commerce. It is hard to imagine that
the majorities in Lopez and Morrison-let alone the Framers-believed this to be a
proper exercise of the commerce power.
Moreover, as shown above, when applied to the UVVA, the four considerations the
Supreme Court uses to determine jurisdictional constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause all favor a finding of unconstitutionality.165 Combine this with the fact that there
has been no showing that either the states are less capable or incapable, or that the
federal government is more capable, of addressing the issue of violence against the
unborn,' 66 and the law begins to look like nothing more than another step toward a
plenary police power.
CONCLUSION
The UVVA is constitutional insofar as it does not directly violate any of the
Supreme Court's federalism or commerce power decisions. To be convicted under this
Act, one must harm or kill an unborn fetus in connection with another activity that,
presumably, Congress has already constitutionally criminalized. To that end, Congress
has not regulated any additional conduct by passing the UVVA and, thus, has not acted
beyond its jurisdictional authority as it now stands.
The Supreme Court should nevertheless strike down the UVVA as an
unconstitutional federal regulation. In so doing, the Court would not only be consistent
but also correct. The UVVA does not pass constitutional muster under the Lopez and
Morrison considerations. It also violates the spirit of those decisions by criminalizing
violence that has no inherent connection to interstate commerce, a concern traditionally
left to the states to regulate.
The Supreme Court's decision in Jones, combined with the lower courts' continued
deference to Congress even after Lopez and Morrison, however, places doubt as to
whether the UVVA will eventually be struck down. This is not the only source for
concern, though. In the specific context of the UVVA, the advocates for both sides face
an inherent dilemma that will likely keep the enumerated powers issue from ever
reaching the courts (unless, of course, done sua sponte).
165. See supra Part III.A.
166. Some commentators and even lower courts are ofthe opinion that, strict adherence
to the Constitution notwithstanding, violations of federalism are less troublesome where the
federal government is arguably better able to combat the evils sought to be addressed. See, e.g.,
United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 94 (2nd Cir. 1998); Bradley, supra note 2, at 600-02.
One example of this is the entirely intrastate purchase and possession of firearms. See Bradley,
supra note 2, at 601 (arguing that the federal weapons-possession statute is permissible, because
"[tjhe states are not in a good position to regulate the national and international trade" of those
dangerous weapons). Although such reasoning is dubious on its face because it recognizes the
possible federalism violations and nevertheless condones them, it is not an issue for this Note
and will, therefore, not be addressed further, other than to note its existence and to preemptively
respond to such an argument.
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.As of the time this Note was written, there had, been one court challenge to the
UVVA. 16 7 Not only did the. plaintiff in'that case not challenge Congress's power to
enact § 184 1,168 he actually sought to have its scope extended and argued that the
UVVA effectively superseded Roe v. Wade. 169 Although this case was
unceremoniously dismissed,170 there are sure to be other, more substantive challenges
to the UVVA that will not be dismissed so easily:
Needless to say, the issue of criminalizing violence against the unborn is
controversial. What is patently.obvious from the debates on the floor of both houses of
Congress and from the firestorm of commentary is that the status of the unborn is both
polarizing and galvanizing. 17 The problem thatboth sides face, however, is that both
want to "win" the UVVA debate, but would like to do so without invoking Commerce
Clause doctrine. Generally speaking, the ideological and philosophical breakdown is as
follows: supporters of the UVVA's substance are more likely to favor a curtailment of
the commerce power, while opponents of the UVVA's substance are more likely to
favor an expansion of the commerce: power. Assuming: for the sake of argument that
that is a fair statement, the inherent dilemma is obvious. Those who would like to see
the UVVA struck down do not want to further the Lopez-Morrison trend because of the
effect that it would have on Congress's ability to legislate in the future. 172 Conversely,
those who would like to see it upheld do not want to interfere with or marginalize those
decisions for the same reason.
Unfortunately, the opponents of legislation that protects unborn victims of violence
are less likely to challenge the UVVA on enumerated powers grounds than one might
otherwise imagine (or hope). Speaking in partisan generalities, for Democrats, the
UVVA represents an unwanted attempt by Congress to define when life begins,
potentially paving the way for the overturning of Roe v. Wade. For Republicans, the
UVVA represents an unwanted attempt by Congress to expand its powers and encroach
on rights traditionally reserved for the states. While both sides have at least some
interest in seeing the law struck down; neither side is likely to challenge it on
enumerated powers grounds. Democrats do not want to limit what Congress may
regulate under the Commerce Clause, and Republicans do not want to strike down a
law that may signal a fundamental change in abortion rights.
As shown above, the UVVA raises constitutional concerns under the Supreme
Court's current Commerce Clause doctrine. 173 Perhaps the more interesting issue, then,
is whether either side will be willing to challenge the legislation on that basis. Doing so
would effectively advance one side's agenda while simultaneously doing harm to its
167. See Carlin v. United States, No. 04-1666,2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14252 (E.D. Pa.
July 26, 2004).
168. Id.
169. Id. at *2.
170. Id. at *1, *6.
171. See generally supra Part I.B.
172. The one notable exception to this is Representative Paul. See supra text
accompanying notes 116-20. For Representative Paul, while the "[p]rotection of life-born or
unborn-against initiations of violence is of vital importance. . . , it must be left to the States'
criminal justice systems." 150 CONG. REc. H658 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Paul).
173. See supra Parts lIl.A, C.
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greater constitutional philosophy. One hopes, of course, that both sides decide to do
the right thing-that is, seek to have the law struck down as being beyond the scope of
the federal government's constitutional powers. Since that argument is politically
unpopular and went almost completely unexplored in the congressional debates,
however, one must hope that the UVVA's opponents are more strongly tied to their
abortion ideology than to their belief in an expansive commerce power.
One possible solution to this dilemma is for the courts to address the issue sua
sponte when a lawsuit is inevitably brought questioning the UVVA's constitutionality
on other grounds. As shown above, however, even after Lopez, the lower courts have
demonstrated an unwillingness to strike down acts of Congress on Commerce Clause
grounds. Any serious treatment of federalism concerns, then, will probably not occur if
and until a case involving the UVVA reaches the Supreme Court.
If the Court were to grant a writ of certiorari in such a case, the Court might very
well decide to strike down the law based on Lopez and Morrison. Doing so would not
only aid the Court in avoiding a discussion of abortion and abortion rights, but would
also provide the most logical disposition of the case. Before considering the
constitutionality of the substance of the law, the Court should first question whether
Congress was empowered to enact it at all. Whether Congress has attempted to regulate
an activity not authorized under Article I is a threshold issue in any case questioning
the validity of a congressional act., and by disposing of the case on commerce power
grounds, the Court would also save itself from the accusations of illegitimacy and
legislating from the bench it would otherwise receive by defining, furthering, limiting,
or eliminating abortion rights vis-A-vis the Constitution.
The Constitution limits the power of Congress in order to safeguard the states and
individuals. The Constitution also entrusts the Supreme Court with the duty of
maintaining those safeguards through constitutional interpretation. With the UVVA,
Congress has gone beyond the powers granted to it in Article I. The Court, therefore,
should extend its current Commerce Clause doctrine and strike down the law.
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